Is Bhartrhari an Advaitin? (2)
In the
scholastic debates, the concept of the ontological Sabda Brahman along with
epistemic notion of mAyA-avidyA and kAla has received much
attention during the post-modern development of Indological studies in India
especially during the years 1959-1990. Problematizing the dilemma on the
doctrinal identity, Gaurinath Sastri, in his introduction to his work ‘The
philosophy of Word and Meaning’, writes “It is interesting point to discuss
whether the grammarian like the Vedäntist declares that the Supreme Reality in
his system is of the nature of bliss. It has been very cogently established by
the Vedäntist dialecticians that a spiritual entity must partake the nature of
bliss; otherwise, its spiritual character cannot be advocated. We must admit
that there is no definite statement in the writings of Bhartåhari that would
unmistakably warrant the conclusion that he is conscious of the logical
necessity of admitting the identity of consciousness with bliss” [§.8,
Gaurinath Sastri; 1959]. Sastri leaves us with a sceptic mood over the problem
of identity which apparently speaks for the significance of the debate that has
sparked in the scholastic world in our contemporary period. By not warranting
any definitive conclusion from Bhartåhari’s position, Sastri clearly takes no
particular stand on the doctrinal identity between Vedanta and the school of grammar
over the concept of Sabda Brahman and its ontological status. A decade later,
in 1964, Dr Biardeau maintained that Bhartåhari advocated reality to the
phenomenal world and further argued that postulating the objective and
subjective aspects of the ontic-reality to Bhartåhari was a logical necessity.
The fortiori of the metaphysical avidyA in Bhartåhari’s view,
according to Biardeau, forms the pivots of Vedantic thought. In the same year,
Prof Subramania Iyer, came out with his research on ‘Bhartåhari – a study’ in
the light of the commentaries of Vrtti (an auto-commentary on VAkyapadiya),
Helaraja’s Sabdaprabha, Vakyakanda Tika (or Vakyapradipa)
[10th CE] and Punyaraja’s tIka on the Trikandi. In
assessing the metaphysical background in his work, Prof Iyer writes,
“there were two
interpretations of Çabdädvaita of Bhartåhari. One can understand how there
mutually exclusive interpretations arose. The use of the words pariNAma
and vivarta as more or less synonymous in the same stanza [Väk
I.112 (120)] in the description of the emergence of the phenomenal world from
the Word-Principle would naturally prompt some readers to think of the system
as a kind of pariNAma vAda while the occurrence of the word avidyA
and the characterization of the phenomenal world as asatya would lead
some others to understand it as vivarta vAda. The history of the
interpretation of Vakyapadiya immediately after Bhartåhari is shrouded in
mystery” [§135; 1964]
In 1990,
Harold Coward in the introduction to the work ‘The Philosophy of Grammarians’,
after a brief analysis of the metaphysical terms of mAyA – avidyA of Sankara
and the functional aspect of the term KAla of Bhartåhari, claims that
“It is probably open to question whether the term avidyA meant for Bhartåhari
as it came to be defined by Sankara some centuries later. Modern commentators
sometimes incorrectly apply concepts they have learned from Advaita Vedanta
when interpreting the Vakyapadiya. Notions such as “superimposition” (adhyAsa),
if seen through Advaita eyes, are probably misleading and unhelpful in
understanding Bhartåhari” [§.40; 1990]. Harold Coward takes a strong position
here to insist that the Bhartåhari’s implication on the functional character of
kAla is completely divorced from Sankara’s Advaita notion of mAyA – avidyA.
These scholars have thus attempted to appropriate and redress variedly smaller
portions of larger puzzle on the issue of identity by embracing the text,
coaxing the contextual meaning of the ‘text’, leaving behind reflections for us to explore. The
aim of this paper is to hermeneutically recycle address the aforementioned
debate, which is essentially concerned to explore the following issues. vide.,
i)
Is Bhartrhari’s characterization of ontic-Being
– the Sabda Brahman identical with the Vedäntin’s doctrine of Being?
ii)
How is the epistemic notion of avidyA of
Advaitins problematized with that of kAla in Bhartåhari’s opinion within
these traditions?
iii)
Can Bhartrhari’s isomorphic usage of crucial
terms like vivarta and pariNAma be hermeneutically resolved in
the light of historical consciousness in doctrinal genesis of Advaita ?